During the World Bank's 2007-2008 Enterprise Survey, a major power crisis hit South Africa. Not surprisingly, this affected managers' perceptions about electricity-the percent saying power was a serious constraint increased from 11 to 49 percent. But managers' perceptions about other areas of the investment climate such as taxation, finance and regulation also deteriorated significantly, suggesting that managers do not compartmentalize their responses to questions about constraints. Other than for electricity, however, relative rankings did not change significantly. This suggests that policymakers using the survey to identify the main constraints would have identified similar constraints before and after the crisis.
I. Introduction
Policymakers use surveys that collect information on firm managers' perceptions about the business environment to identify constraints to private sector development and growth. Rodrik wrote on his blog (2007): "These surveys are used increasingly to diagnose the main constraints facing firms and to identify policy reform priorities. If, for example, firms in country A complain most about the cost of finance while in B they complain about a skill shortage, this is taken as an indication country A is constrained by poor access to finance while country B is constrained by poor human capital"
One example of this is the Investment Climate Assessment [ICA] program, through which the World Bank gives policy advice to developing countries. The ICAs rely in part on managers' perceptions to rank constraints within and across countries.
1 Commenting on ICAs, Rodrik writes "If the term [Investment Climate Assessment] does not mean anything to you, you have not been paying much attention to development policy in recent years."
Surveys have also been used to benchmark countries against each other. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks corruption across countries, is constructed using primary sources based on expert and firm managers' perceptions. Similarly, the Global Competitiveness Report uses the Executive Opinion Survey to rank countries' competitiveness (Schwab, 2009). 2 Although perception data is less common in research than in policymaking, some areas use perception-based data heavily. Much of the crosscountry literature on the causes and consequences of corruption, for example, uses perception data-although often the perceptions of experts rather than managers. 3 There is also a large cross-country literature on property rights protection and governance that uses perception-based data. 4 Finally, cross-country studies on access to finance have also used perception-based data-mostly using data on firm managers' perceptions.
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Despite their use in academic studies and policymaking, many have asked whether perceptions provide useful information. Bertrand and Mullainthan (2001) , for example, argue that cognitive problems, the social acceptability of some responses and wrong, non-and soft attitudes affect reliability.
One criticism of perceptions is that responses about constraints might not only reflect views about particular aspects of the investment climate (e.g., corruption or access to finance) but also the respondents' optimism or pessimism. Managers that are pessimistic might consistently rate all areas of the investment climate as greater constraints than managers that are consistently optimistic (i.e., managers might not compartmentalize responses).
This paper uses a natural experiment to assess whether managers fully compartmentalize their responses. The natural experiment occurred when a serious power crisis hit South Africa during implementation of the World Bank's 2007-08 Enterprise Survey. The paper compares perceptions about electricity and other areas of the investment climate before and after the power crisis to see if they were significantly affected by it. To provide additional evidence that it was the power crisis-rather than other changes-that affected perceptions, the paper will then look at other possible explanations for the observed changes. It will also look at the magnitude of the differences in perceptions to see if they appear to be large enough to affect cross-time and cross-country comparisons. Finally, it will look at whether all areas appear to be affected in similar ways-that is did the crisis affect relative rankings.
The results from this paper suggest several problems with using perceptions to identify constraints. The first is that even though problems in the power sector had been widely noted before the crisis, electricity did not rank among managers' main concerns until after its onset. This suggests that manager's perceptions might not be a good forward-looking way of identifying constraints.
Second, the power crisis appears to have affected perceptions about most other areas of the investment climate. If this is the case, it might be difficult to use perceptions to accurately compare individual aspects of the investment climate over time or across countries. That is, perceptions about a given area are not affected only by problems in that specific area but also by general business confidence. If business confidence differs across countries or across time, it might therefore be difficult to make accurate comparisons of investment climate constraints using perception-based data. 5 See Ayyagari et al. (2008) , Beck et al. (2005; 2006) , and Clarke et al. (2006) .
A more positive finding is that although the crisis might have affected perceptions about some areas of the investment climate more than others, the relative ranking of constraints-except for electricity-did not change significantly after the crisis. As a result, except for electricity, policymakers using the survey to identify the largest constraints would have identified similarbut not identical-constraints before and after the crisis. Although this does not show that managers accurately assess the main constraints that their firms faceor that these constraints are the main constraints to economic development-it shows consistency in relative rankings.
II. Uses of and problems with perception data
Perception data are used-often along with other information-to assess what the binding constraints are to private sector development in a single country and to benchmark constraints across countries or in the same country over time.
6 Crosscountry data on perceptions has also been used to look at things that affect constraints and to see how constraints affect economic outcomes-particularly in the areas of corruption and governance.
7 Perception-based data has also been used to assess how different constraints affect different households or firms within a country or group of countries.
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Despite their use in both policymaking and research, observers have suggested that it is difficult to use this data to either rank constraints within a country or to benchmark constraints over time or across countries. One concern, which is the focus of this paper, is that managers' perceptions about specific areas of the investment climate might reflect their views about the overall quality of the investment climate rather than only their views about specific constraints. That is, managers might say that access to finance is a serious problem because they are concerned about the economy or economic policy generally rather than because they are concerned about access to finance specifically. If this is the case, it will be difficult to rank constraints-unless all their answers are affected to the same degree by whatever biases affect responses-or to make cross-country or crosstime comparisons of constraints-unless firm managers' responses are biased in the same way across time or across countries.
This does not mean that managers do not differentiate between constraints at all. Using data from the Enterprise Surveys, Hallward-Driemeier and Alterido (2009) note that individual respondents respond to questions on different constraints differently. The evidence from South Africa is consistent with thisonly three of over 900 firms had no variation in their responses to the questions on obstacles.
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There is also evidence that managers' perceptions reflect at least in part concern about the specific area. At a cross-country level, manager perceptions about specific areas of the investment climate are correlated with objective measures of constraints in those areas. Hallward-Driemeier and Alterido (2009) find that many subjective measures of the investment climate from the Enterprise Surveys are significantly correlated with objective measures of the investment climate.
10 Although the correlations are statistically significant, however, they are not always high.
It is important to note that even if managers' responses accurately reflect their views about constraints, this does not mean that this provides useful information on what the main constraints to private sector development are. One reason why this might be the case is that the views of managers of interviewed managers might not reflect the views of non-interviewed firms. In some cases, the omissions are due to conscious survey design-most surveys only cover part of the economy.
11 But in addition to firms that are excluded intentionally from the survey, surveys also might not reflect the views of other omitted firms such as firms that are unable to operate in a country due to problems in the investment climate. For example, in countries where the cost or reliability of power supply is binding, firms that rely on constant and cheap power might simply be unable to operate. Hausmann and Velasco (2005) illustrate this point with an analogy to camel and hippos. They note that the few animals that you find in the Sahara will be camels, which have adapted to life in the desert, rather than hippos, which depend heavily upon water. Asking the camels about problems associated with life in the desert might not adequately represent the views of the missing hippos. In this respect, even if the surveys accurately portrayed the views of respondents, they might not accurately reflect the true barriers to development. 9 Firms do not appear to answer questions entirely randomly. For example, firms within South Africa tend to rank similar constraints as the major problems. The average correlation between individual firms responses in South Africa is about 0.26 for the full sample of firms. 10 Gelb et al. (2006) find significant correlations for some measures (e.g., for finance, power, and corruption) in surveys for Africa, but weaker correlations for others (e.g., regulation). Hellman et al. (1999) show that perceptions about exchange rates and telecommunications infrastructure are correlated with objective data using data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia 11 For example, the Executive Opinion Survey used in the Global Competitiveness Report focuses on the large businesses, although this focus has lessened in recent years (Porter et al., 2005, p. 200 
III. Data
This paper uses data from the World Bank's Enterprise Survey for South Africa, a survey of over 900 enterprises with at least five employees that covered Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban in manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale services, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage, and communications, and computer and related activities. 12 The survey took nine months to complete, beginning in July 2007 and ending in March 2008. No interviews were conducted between December 18 th and January 21 st because it was difficult to obtain interviews over the Christmas period.
In mid-January, South Africa was hit by a series of serious power outages and brownouts. 13 The immediate cause of the crisis was some power plants being closed for routine maintenance, others breaking down, and coal stocks dwindling after unseasonably wet weather closed some open pits (Lewis, 2008) .
Before the crisis, South African firms had been used to reliable power. The 2005 ICA, which was based upon a 2003 Enterprise Survey, noted that firms in South Africa suffered fewer outages than firms in other middle income economies such as Brazil, China and Malaysia (Clarke et al., 2007; . Consistent with this, only about 9 percent of managers interviewed before the crisis said that power was a serious problem.
This said, however, the crisis was not entirely unexpected. For example, in September 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit noted "despite a small capacity margin, the creaking system is coping to date. However, there remains a risk of power outages" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007) . Similarly, although power sector infrastructure did not specifically rank among the main constraints, both the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 2006) and the International Panel of Growth summary report (Hausmann, 2006) noted that underinvestment in the power sector meant that accelerated investment was needed. At the time of the crisis, it was widely reported that the longer term problems due to underinvestment would mean that the power was likely to remain a constraint until new power plants could start operating in about five years (McCreal, 2008) .
The crisis resulted in a large increase in the number of firms saying that electricity was a serious problem in the Enterprise Survey. In the last half of 2007, only 9 percent of firms said that power was a serious constraint and only 6 percent said it was the biggest constraint that they faced. For firms interviewed after that start of the crisis in mid-January 2008, 48 percent said it was a serious constraint and 34 percent said it was the biggest constraint.
12 World Bank (2008) describes the sampling methodology in greater detail. 13 See Center for Development and Enterprise Roundtable (2008) for a description of the crisis. The crisis, however, also appeared to affect perceptions about other areas of the investment climate. Although perceptions about electricity worsened more than perceptions about other areas, firms interviewed between January and March 2008 were more concerned about every area of the investment climate other than crime than firms interviewed between July and December 2007 (see Table 1 ). Taking this at face value, it appears that nearly every area of the investment climate became a more serious constraint between late 2007 and early 2008. To look at his is in more depth, the next section analyzes the data econometrically. Although the firms interviewed in the second group of interviews were similar to firms in the first group, there were some differences (see Table 2 ). An econometric analysis can confirm that changes in perception are not due to changes in sample composition before and after the crisis.
IV. Econometric results

Methodology.
The question of whether perceptions changed after the crisis is explored by estimating different versions of the equation (1): (1) Actual perceptions are unobserved. The observed variable is a categorical variable that takes five possible values for each area of the investment climate that corresponds to "no obstacle", "minor obstacle", "moderate obstacle", "major obstacle" and "very severe obstacle"
The main variable of interest, TD i , is a dummy variable indicating that the interview was conducted after mid-January. Since no interviews were conducted between December 18 th and January 21 st -the survey team took a break over this period-the dummy indicates whether the interview was conducted before midDecember or after mid-January
The regressions include a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is foreign owned, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm exports, a continuous variable indicating firm size (log of number of workers) and a continuous variable indicating the age of the firm (log of age in years). In addition, a series of dummies indicating sector of operations and location are included.
The error term is assumed to be normally distributed. Because the dependent variable is an index variable, the model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (i.e., an ordered Probit model). Results from the regressions for each of the obstacles are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 Table 3 for additional notes. ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
Empirical results
The main variable of interest is the dummy variable indicating the time of the interview. Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the equation for perceptions about electricity (see Table 3 ). Since higher values on the index mean that the firm manager perceived electricity as a more serious obstacle, the positive coefficient indicates that managers interviewed between January and March 2008 were more likely to say that power was a serious problem than managers interviewed between July and December 2007. This is consistent with the idea that managers interviewed after the start of the crisis were more concerned about power than those interviewed before the start. The difference is very large. Based upon the predicted probabilities from the ordered Probit model (see Table 5 ), close to half of managers would have said that power was a major or very severe problem in interviews after the start of the crisis while only about one in ten managers said the same before the start of the crisis. This strongly suggests that managers were surprised by the onset of the crisis or at least by the impact that the crisis had on their firms' operations. A more interesting question is whether the crisis had a significant impact on perceptions about other areas of the investment climate. This will give some idea about how effectively managers compartmentalize their perceptions about different areas of the investment climate. If the crisis appears to have had an impact on perceptions about all or most areas of the investment climate, this would suggest that their responses are at least in part affected by their overall confidence in the economy.
Firm managers do not appear to fully compartmentalize their perceptions.
14 Of the 15 other areas of the investment climate that were asked about, managers interviewed after the beginning of the crises were significantly more likely to say that 11 were more serious problems than managers of similar firms interviewed before the crisis (see Table 3 and Table 4 ).
The changes are large. Estimates of the average increase in the likelihood that the manager would say that the area was a significant problem for the areas of the investment climate other than electricity were between 2 and 9 percent for the areas where the differences were statistically significant (see Table 5 ). Given that there were only three areas of the investment climate-crime, corruption, and access to finance--that more than 10 percent of firms said were serious problems before the crisis, these changes are large.
V. Other factors that might have affected perceptions
Although the increase in concern about most other areas of the investment climate coincided with the power crisis, the power crisis was not a true experiment. Other changes occurred during this period that might have also affected perceptions. Two particular changes were the growing turmoil in international capital markets due to problems in sub-prime mortgages in the United States and political changes in South Africa that saw Jacob Zuma replacing Thabo Mbeki as ANC leader (Bureau of Economic Research and Rand Merchant Bank, 2008) .
Consistent with the idea that the financial crisis affected perceptions, concern about access to finance increased more over this period than concern about other areas of the investment climate. Based upon the estimates in Table 5 , about 10 percent of firms would have said access to finance was a serious problem before the end of 2007 compared with about 18 percent of firms between January and March 2008. 15 The percent of firms saying it was a serious problem was larger than the increases for any area other than electricity. It is, however, less clear that the financial crisis would have affected perceptions about areas of the investment climate other than access to finance.
14 This does not imply that they do not at least partly compartmentalize responses. Consistent with this, firms tend to agree on what the biggest problems in the investment climate are. The average correlation between perceptions about obstacles across the firms in the survey is 0.26. If managers fully compartmentalized their responses, the correlation should be zero. 15 The survey was mostly complete before the largest disruptions associated with global financial crisis occurred. The last interview in March was on March 17 Consistent with this, concern about political instability increased significantly over this period. In the last half of 2007, but before the conference, only 1 percent of firms said that political instability was a problem compared with 6 percent of firms in the period after the conference. Although this was not among the largest changes in absolute terms, it started from a low starting point. But even after the change, political instability did not rank among the top constraints.
It is not clear, however, whether the other changes in perceptions strongly support the idea that the decline in perceptions was due to the potential for a less business friendly regime. For example, concern about most areas of regulation increased only modestly after the change in ANC leadership. Concern about tax administration, business licensing, and trade regulation increased modestly and concern about labor regulation might have even declined after the change in political leadership. With respect to labor regulation in particular this might be surprising since Mr. Zuma was seen at the time as more pro-labor than President Mbeki. 16 Similarly, some areas where concern increased significantly such as telecommunications, and possibly transportation, would seem less vulnerable to changes in political leadership. In this respect, the observed changes do not appear to strongly support the idea that they were due to the political changes.
Since these other changes might have affected perceptions, it is however useful to look at other evidence. In this section, we look at whether those firms that became more concerned about electricity after the power crisis also became more concerned about other areas of the investment climate and whether other political changes that appear to have affected the likelihood that Mr. Zuma would replace President Mbeki affected perceptions.
Differential changes in perceptions across different types of firms
If changes in perceptions about power were driving changes in perceptions about other areas of the investment climate, we would expect to see the biggest declines in favorable perceptions among enterprises whose perceptions about electricity declined the most. Although this would not be conclusive-changes in perceptions about other areas could be driving the changes in perceptions about electricity-it seems unlikely that the relationship would be reversed given that the changes in perceptions were much larger for electricity than for other areas.
Unfortunately, firms were only interviewed once during the 2007-2008 Enterprise Survey. It is therefore not possible to make direct comparisons of identical firms immediately before and after the crisis. We therefore compare changes in perceptions across regions and sectors of the economy before and after the crisis. We also compare changes in perceptions between 2003 and 2008 for the small number of panel firms that were interviewed after the start of the crisis.
Geographic Comparisons. Although the rolling blackouts affected firms throughout the country, it is possible some cities were affected more than others. To see if this was the case, we interact the dummy indicating that the interview was conducted after the crisis with dummies for the four cities covered in the survey (see Table 6 ). Because city dummies are also included, the coefficient on the interaction term indicates how perceptions changed after the start of the crisis in the different provinces relative to perceptions in that province before the crisis. Because no interviews were conducted in Port Elizabeth after the start of the crisis, this interaction term is dropped. Table 3 for additional notes and for additional controls. ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels Perceptions about power changed in all cities (see Table 6 ). In the regression for perceptions about electricity, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant. However, perceptions worsened more significantly in Durban and Cape Town. Although the coefficients for these two cities are similar, they are significantly larger than the coefficient for Johannesburg. This suggests that perceptions about electricity declined more in Durban and Cape Town than in Johannesburg.
A similar pattern holds for the coefficients on the interaction terms in a regression for average perceptions in areas other than electricity. Although perceptions worsened in all three places, they worsened more in Cape Town and Durban. This is consistent with the idea that firms most affected by the crisis tended to become more pessimistic about other areas of the investment climate.
Sectoral Comparisons. A similar analysis can be conducted at the sector level (see Table 7 ). Power outages affect different firms to different degrees depending on how their production processes depend on reliable power. We therefore also interact the late interview dummy with the sector dummies and rerun the regressions. 18 To see whether perceptions about other areas change more for firms whose perceptions about power changed more, we look at the panel firms that were interviewed after the start of the crisis (i.e., after Jan 2008). For each firm, we calculate the change in average perceptions in areas other than electricity and changes in perceptions about electricity between 2003 and 2008. We then regress the change in perceptions about other areas on the change in perception about electricity. This is essentially a fixed effects regression removing the fixed effects through differencing. The coefficient on the change in perceptions about power is positive and statistically significant (see Table 8 ). This is consistent with the idea that firms whose perceptions about electricity declined the most between 2003 and 2008 also suffered the biggest declines in perceptions about other areas. Table 3 for additional notes. ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
Overall these three results suggest that firms that were more affected by the power crisis also become more pessimistic about other areas of the investment climate. Although this does not show that their negative perceptions about the power crisis caused their negative perceptions about other areas of the investment climate, it is consistent with this idea.
Changes in perceptions before and after other political changes
One reason why the ANC conference might not have had a large impact on perceptions about other areas of the investment climate is that a change in leadership appeared likely-although not certain-before the conference took place. One reason for this was that President Mbeki was unable to run for a third term as the President of the Republic of South Africa. South Africa would therefore have to have a new President after the 2009 general election unless there was a constitutional amendment to end term limits. Although Mr. Mbeki could have continued as President of the ANC, it was very likely that there was going to be a change in political leadership in 2009 if not before. Moreover, Mr. Zuma appeared to be the favorite even before the December conference.
Another factor that suggested that Mr. Zuma was likely to replace President Mbeki as President of the ANC was that he had very strong support during the nomination process for the ANC Presidency. Jacob Zuma received the nomination for ANC President in five of nine provinces and from the ANC's Women's League in late November 2007. Mr. Mbeki was nominated in only four provinces. Moreover, when Mr. Zuma won, he won by a significant margin while the voting was close in the provinces won by Mr. Mbeki. Overall, the provincial results gave Mr. Zuma 2,270 votes compared with 1,396 votes for Mr. Mbeki. Even before the conference, Mr. Zuma appeared therefore to have a substantial chance of replacing Mr. Mbeki as leader of the ANC.
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Because the ANC conference and the start of the power crisis occurred during the break in interviews in late December 2007 and early January 2008, it is not possible to separate the two events when looking at the change in perceptions between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008. It is, however, possible to compare perceptions before and after the provincial nominations in November 2007. Given that the nominations suggested that Mr. Zuma would likelyalthough not certainly-replace Mr. Mbeki as President of the ANC, we might expect his strong showing during the nomination process to affect perceptions. A non-result might suggest either that the change in leadership was not expected to have a large immediate impact on the investment climate or that Mr. Zuma's 19 Although it was possible that Mr. Mbeki could recapture some votes before the conferences, the nominations suggested that Mr. Zuma had a very good chance of becoming ANC leader during the December conference. After the nomination-but before the ANC conference-the BBC quoted Susan Booysen of Wits University in Johannesburg as saying of the nomination results that 'I can't see how this cannot be the end of Mbeki's candidacy' (BBC News, 2007) . Similarly, before the conference, the Independent (UK) said that '[a]nalysts say the fact that Mr. Zuma made such inroads in Mr. Mbeki's stronghold proved that the latter was headed for an ignominious exit from power when the ruling party meets [in December]' (Peta, 2007) . replacement of Mr. Mbeki had already been factored into perceptions before the nomination occurred (i.e., before November 2007).
To see whether perceptions changed after the nomination process was complete, we run a set of regressions similar to those discussed above. For the interviews that took place before the ANC conference, we regress perceptions about the investment climate on a dummy indicating that the interview was conducted between the nominations in late November 2007 and the conference in December 2007. Positive coefficients would suggest that concern increased after the nomination process was complete. Results are shown for electricity, political instability and the average of the non-electricity constraints. 20 The coefficient on the dummy indicating that the interview was conducted after the nomination is statistically insignificant in all three regressions (see Table 9 ). Table 3 for additional notes. ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
The statistically insignificant coefficient suggests that the nomination had little impact on perceptions. Given that by this time, it was clear that Mr. Zuma had a strong change of becoming ANC leader, this suggests that either his victory was anticipated-and therefore had little impact on perceptions-or that his 20 In separate regressions for the other constraints, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the interview took place after the nomination was statistically insignificant at a 10 percent level in all but two regressions. In the regression for crime, it was negative and statistically significant (i.e., firms were less concerned about crime after the nomination) and was positive and statistically significant in the regression for telecommunications. It is not clear that these areas should have been particularly affected by Mr. Zuma's nomination. nomination was not expected to have a large impact on specific areas of the investment climate.
In summary, the power crisis was not a true experiment. Other changes occurred in the world economy and in South Africa between December 2007 and January 2008 that might have affected perceptions about the investment climate. In particular, the global financial crisis worsened and the change in the leadership of the ANC might have also affected perceptions about the investment climate. The results from this section, however, suggest that the power crisis was the major factor affecting perceptions. First, the results suggest a broad decline in perceptions across all areas of the investment climate between these two periods. The pattern of the decline does not appear entirely consistent with the pattern that would be expected due to either the financial crisis or the change in ANC leadership. Second, the results suggest that firms whose perceptions about power were most affected by the crisis became more pessimistic about other areas of the investment climate than other firms. This is also consistent with the idea that the power crisis affected perceptions other than those about electricity. Finally, the change in ANC leadership was not entirely unexpected by the time of the ANC conference. Mr. Zuma went into the December conference with a strong lead over Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Zuma taking the lead during the nomination process did not have a large impact on perceptions about the investment climate. This lack of change could be because Mr. Zuma's victory had at least partly been anticipated before the nomination process was complete.
VI. Magnitude of the changes in perceptions
This section of the report looks at two questions: (i) whether the changes in perception before and after the crisis-and potentially political changes-affected relative rankings; and (ii) whether the changes would affect cross-country or cross-time comparisons.
Effect on relative rankings
Not surprisingly after the crisis, more firms ranked electricity (about half) as a problem than any other problem. In contrast, it is estimated that only one in ten firms would have said the same before the crisis. Based upon the percent of firms saying that each problem was a major problem, this moved electricity from the third greatest constraint before the crisis to the greatest constraint after the crisis.
For the most part, however, the changes in predicted probabilities did not have a significant impact on relative rankings based upon the percent of firms that said each area was a significant problem for areas other than electricity (see Table  10 ). Other than electricity, the three greatest constraints based upon the predicted probability were crime, corruption, and access to finance before the power crisis. These remained as the three greatest constraints after the crisis. Similarly, few firms rated business licensing, tax administration, trade regulation, or courts as a serious constraint before or after the crisis. Note: Predicted probabilities are shown in Table 10 .
The biggest changes in relative rankings were for political instability, which went from fifteenth to tenth after the start of the crisis, and labor regulation, which went from sixth to eleventh. As noted above, the change in political instability might be related to the December 2007 ANC conference.
It is less clear why perceptions about labor regulation changed. Both before and after the crisis, about five to six percent of firm managers said that labor regulation was a problem both before and after the crisis. This, however, results in a large relative drop-from sixth place before the crisis to eleventh place afterwards. Given that the financial crisis should not affect perceptions about labor regulation and that Jacob Zuma was generally perceived as less business friendly and more pro-labor than President Mbeki, it seems unlikely that this change was related to either of these factors. Moreover, there were not any significant changes in labor legislation between late 2007 and early 2008. 21 The Doing Business measure of labor regulation, which is based upon written rules, was unchanged between 2006 and 2009. It is interesting to note that concern about the other constraint that is related to labor-inadequately educated laboralso fell relative to other constraints (from fourth to sixth).
In summary, although perceptions about most areas changed after the crisis, for the most part this did not affect relative rankings other than for electricity. Concern about crime was very high both before and after the crisis and although firms were more likely to say that corruption and access to finance were serious problems after the crisis, these remained as the second and third greatest constraints after the crisis. In short, with the exception of electricity, a policymaker assessing the greatest constraints to firm operations using measures based upon the percent of firms that said each area was a serious problem would reach similar conclusions about the main problems before and after the crisis. Although, as discussed above, this does not show that these are the main constraints in South Africa, it shows that managers' perceptions about relative constraints were not drastically altered by the power crisis.
Effect on cross-time and cross-country comparisons
The previous results suggest that the changes in perceptions are relatively large in terms of comparisons between pre-and post-crisis perceptions (see Table 5 ). It is also interesting, however, to look at whether these changes are large enough to affect cross-time and cross-country comparisons. Given the percent of firms that said that particular areas of the obstacle were serious problems, between 0 and 15 percent before the crisis for most areas other than crime, and the size of the relative changes, which were between about 2 percent and 7 percent in most cases, it seems plausible that this could affect comparisons. An earlier Enterprise Survey, which only covered manufacturing, was conducted in South Africa in 2003. For the areas of the investment climate where the questions were asked in the same way, it is possible to compare the percent of manufacturing firms that said that various areas of the investment climate were serious problems between the 2003 survey and the 2007-08 survey.
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This comparison provides some limited support for the idea that some of the changes are large enough to affect comparisons (see Table 11 ). Other than for electricity, the most notable difference is for corruption. Based upon the percent of firms that said that it was a serious obstacle, it would appear that corruption was reduced or stayed about the same between 2003 and late 2007 (from 16 percent to 14 percent). In contrast, if the comparisons were made between 2003 and 2009, it appear that concern about corruption might have increased. 22 The 2003 survey only covered manufacturing so the comparisons in Table 11 are only for manufacturing. They are also only for the areas that are asked about similarly in both surveys. For example, the 2003 survey asked about access to finance (collateral) and included a separate question on cost of finance (interest rates), while the 2007 survey asked about access to finance (availability and cost). This, and other variables with significant wording changes, are omitted.
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Journal of Globalization and Development, Vol. 2 [2011 ], Iss. 1, Art. 3 DOI: 10.2202 /1948 -1837 .1132 Comparisons for access to land and business permits might also lead to different conclusions about trends in perceptions. Table 12 ). These countries are chosen because they are middle income economics that neighbor South Africa. There were several changes in rankings due to the power crisis other than for power. For example, fewer firms said that informality was a serious constraint in South Africa (8 percent) before the crisis than in Namibia (11 percent) in 2006, but more firms said it was a serious constraint in South Africa after the crisis (19 percent). Similarly before the crisis fewer firms in South Africa said access to land was a serious constraint (8 percent) than in Namibia (10 percent) or Swaziland (12 percent). But after the crisis, more firms in South Africa said it was a serious problem. Similar points could be made about several of the other measures (e.g., access to finance, corruption, political instability, business licensing, and telecommunications). This emphasizes that the changes due to the crisis appear to be significant enough to also change the cross-country rankings based upon the percent of firms that say each area was a problem.
VII. Conclusions
During the field work from the 2007-08 South Africa Enterprise Survey, a major power crisis hit South Africa. Before the crisis only about one in ten South African firms said that power was a serious constraint for their firms' operations. After the crisis, almost half did. The paper discusses how the crisis highlights problems with perception-based data.
One problem was the massive rise in concern about the power sector. Even though it was widely noted before the crisis that outages could become a problem, electricity was not seen as a serious problem until after the crisis. This suggests that firm surveys might not be useful in identifying future constraints.
More disturbingly, perceptions about other areas of the investment climate unrelated to power might have also been affected by the crisis. After the onset of the crisis, firm managers were significantly more likely to say that eleven of fifteen areas were serious constraints than managers of similar firms interviewed before the crisis. The changes in perceptions about other areas of the investment climate were large. In most cases, the crisis appears to have raised the likelihood that managers would say the other areas of the investment climate were serious problems by between 2 and 7 percentage points. Since before the crisis, most areas were ranked as serious problems by between 0 and 15 percent of firms, this is a large change. Moreover, as shown above, these changes were large enough to complicate cross-time and cross-country comparisons. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that when firms are asked about specific areas of the investment climate, their responses reflect not only concern about that specific area of the investment climate, but also general business confidence.
A more positive results is that the crisis had only a modest impact on relative rankings. Except for electricity, the other top constraints remained the same before and after the crisis (crime, access to finance, and corruption).
Although this does not mean that these are the most binding constraints in South Africa-as noted above there are other concerns about perception-based data-it shows consistency in relative rankings before and after the crisis.
Because the power crisis did not occur in a vacuum, it is possible that other changes might have affected perceptions about some areas of the investment climate. In particular, the global financial crisis worsened over this period and there was a change in leadership in the ANC that might have also affected perceptions. Robustness checks, however, suggest that the power crisis was the major factor affecting perceptions. First, the results suggest a broad decline in perceptions across all areas of the investment climate between these two periods. Moreover, to the extent that there were differences in changes in perceptions, they did not appear entirely consistent with changes due to either the financial crisis or the change in ANC leadership. For example, despite the victory of the more prolabor Mr. Zuma's in the ANC election, perceptions about labor regulation did not change significantly over this period. Second, the results suggest that firms whose perceptions about power were most affected by the power crisis became more pessimistic about other areas of the investment climate than other firms. Finally, the change in ANC leadership was not entirely unexpected. Mr. Zuma went into the December conference with a strong lead over Mr. Mbeki. That perceptions did not appear to change significantly as his victory appeared to become more likely (i.e., after the November nomination process was complete) could be because Mr. Zuma's victory had been anticipated before the completion of the nomination process in November.
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